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BRAZIL AND THE UNITED KINGDOM: 
TRADE RELATIONS IN THE 1990s 
Victor Bulmer-Thomas 
Trade relations between Brazil and the United Kingdom (UK) are long 
established. Following the transfer of the Portuguese royal family to Rio de 
Janeiro in 1808, Britain used its influence to secure special terms for its exports, 
while the British market soon became immensely important for the imperial 
government of independent Brazil.1 By the middle of the 19th century (see Table 
1), one third of all Brazil's exports were destined for the UK and over half of all 
its imports came from Britain. 
This dominant position could not be expected to continue indefinitely, but as 
late as 1900 the UK was still providing nearly one third of all Brazil's imports 
(the rise of coffee meant that the UK, where tea was the preferred beverage, was 
being displaced by the USA as a destination for Brazil's exports). Even in 1950 
(see Table 1), Britain remained an important trading partner for Brazil, although 
the Brazilian market was not of great significance to the UK. 
The subsequent (relative) decline in the trade links between both countries 
continued unabated until the early 1990s. The trade missions sent by Britain to 
Brazil in the 1960s and 1970s made little difference and trade relations dwindled 
to an insignificant level. As elsewhere in Latin America, Britain saw its share of 
the import market fall to less than two per cent, while Brazil's exports to the UK 
were overshadowed by its exports to many other countries in the European 
Union (EU) and had fallen to less than three per cent of the total by 1995 (see 
Table 1). 
Trade relations between Brazil and the United Kingdom have therefore 
declined in importance. However, recent changes in Brazil have created 
expectations of a change in the relationship - at least as far as UK exports to 
Brazil are concerned. Trade liberalisation in Brazil, beginning in 1990, has led 
to a sharp fall in tariff rates and a rapid growth in imports. This trend was 
accelerated following the introduction of the Piano Real in July 1994 as a result 
of real exchange rate appreciation. Indeed, so rapid has been the growth of 
Brazil's imports that between 1992 and 1996, it was the fastest growing market 
for British goods in the world with an increase in UK exports (valued in sterling) 
of 210%. 
1 See Manchester (1933). 
Table 1 - Trade shares for Brazil and UK, c.1850 to 1995 
Exports/Imports to/from partner as a percentage of total. 
BRAZIL: exports 33.5 15.9 8.3 3.0 2.8 
BRAZIL: imports 53.3 31.3 12.3 2.0 1.9 
UK: exports 3.5 2.0 2.2 0.3 I 0.4 
UK: imports 2.0 1.1 1.5 0.6 0.6 
Sources: Derived from Piatt (1972), IBGE (1987), Mitchell (1992), IMF (1996) 
Since this explosion in British exports has coincided with an increase in trade 
missions sent by Britain to Brazil and much greater attention from British 
government ministers, it is tempting to conclude that Britain has reaped the 
benefit of its greater trade effort. However, the UK share of the Brazilian import 
market did not increase between 1990 and 1995 (see Table 1), so that Britain's 
'exceptional' performance is mainly a reflection of the UK maintaining its 
market share of fast-growing imports. Thus, if and when the rate of growth of 
Brazil's imports declines (see last section), the rate of growth of British exports 
to Brazil is also likely to fall. 
The changes in the British economy over the last two decades, while not as 
spectacular as those in Brazil, have also created new opportunities for exporters. 
The secular decline of Britain's manufacturing industry has continued giving rise 
to a substantial increase in manufactured imports, as the British economy 
becomes ever more oil- and services-based. The Single European Market 
(SEM), formally adopted in 1992, has eliminated most of the Non-Tariff 
Barriers (NTBs) between member states of the European Union, creating 
opportunities for exporters to service the whole of the European market from 
one entry point. The pound sterling has also appreciated strongly in anticipation 
of European Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999 without British participation. 
There has been some growth in Brazil's exports to the UK as a result of these 
and other factors, but (see next section) the performance has been relatively 
undynamic and Brazil is now expected to lose its traditional surplus on visible 
trade with the UK. 
Although the level of bilateral trade is very modest, there are limits on what 
can be done to improve it. Trade relations between both countries are 
increasingly governed by rules established in regional or international treaties. 
Brazil's external tariffs are, in most cases, subject to agreement with 
MERCOSUL partners, with the Common External Tariff (CET) set to cover all 
imports by 2006. Even in the case of those goods for which no CET has been 
set, Brazil's degree of freedom is limited (upwards) by membership of the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) and (downwards) by powerful industrial 
lobbies. 
c.1850 c.1900 c.1950 1990 1995 
Britain does not control its tariff rates, while trade policy for goods (but not 
yet services) is the responsibility exclusively of the European Commission (EC). 
The latter organisation is responsible for determining the Generalised System of 
Preferences (GSP) for all EU members and is phasing out almost all preferences 
for Brazil on agricultural and agroindustrial exports to the EU between 1997 and 
1999. Export credits are still a national responsibility, but the Export Credits 
Guarantee Department (ECGD) has to work within parameters established by 
the EC as part of its commitments to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD). 
The bilateral trade relationship would undoubtedly be stimulated if the 
framework agreement signed between the EU and MERCOSUL in 1995 were to 
be converted into a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). However, while Brazil plays a 
dominant - not to say hegemonic - role within MERCOSUL, British influence 
within the EU is much more modest and the proposed FTA is likely to be very 
difficult to achieve. Furthermore, the EU appears more concerned with 
launching the third stage of EMU on schedule and enlarging membership to 
include the countries of central Europe. Both changes are likely to create 
difficulties for the expansion of Brazil's exports to the EU in the medium term 
(see last section). 
In the next section, I explore recent trends in the bilateral trade relationship 
at both an aggregated and disaggregated level. I then develop an econometric 
model to explain British and Brazilian bilateral exports on a global basis, which 
demonstrates that both countries have 'underperformed' in their exports to each 
other. This is followed first by an analysis of British underperformance in the 
Brazilian market and then by an analysis of Brazilian underperformance in the 
British market. The final section looks at prospects for trade relations in the next 
ten years. 
Recent Trends 
Although the long-term trade relationship between Britain and Brazil has been 
subject to secular decline, the short-term trend since 1990 has been very 
dynamic. The most spectacular evidence of this is provided by the growth of 
British exports to Brazil, which have risen from $481 million in 1992 to $1,354 
million in 1996 (see Table 2). Curiously, the Brazilian statistics on imports from 
the UK are not the same, although they tell a similar story. The Brazilian data 
(see Table 2), although they record the c.i.f. value of imports, consistently 
undervalue the UK data on the f.o.b. value of exports.2 
The Brazilian market has been the most successful in the world for British 
exports since 1992, as mentioned in the previous section. Indeed, this trend 
continued in the first five months of 1997, with UK exports to Brazil rising by 
2 The f.o.b. value of exports from country A to country B is usually assumed to be 10% 
lower than the c.i.f. value of imports of country B from country A. 
33.6% over the same period in 1996. Britain, however, has not increased its 
market share significantly so that the rate of growth of UK exports to Brazil 
remains determined above all by the rate of growth of Brazil's imports. 
Table 2. - Brazil-UK Trade, 1990-6 ($mn) 
(A) Brazil 
Exports $mn 945 1,057 1,286 1,140 1,229 1,326 ! 
r 
1,324 | 
Imports $mn 460 489 406 560 755 975 
1246 
Balance $mn 4485 +568 +880 +580 +474 +351 +78 
(B) UK 
Exports $mn 589 596 481 622 807 1,067 1,354a j 
Imports $mn 1,269 1,350 1,562 1,357 1,408 1,535 : 1,573a 
Balance $mn -680 -754 -1,081 -735 -601 -468 -219| 
(a) Converted from pound sterling at 1.60 exchange rate 
Sources: 1990-5, IMF (1996); for 1996 DTI (1997) and SECEX (1997) 
The growth in Brazil's exports to the UK has been much more restrained 
(see Table 2) and Brazil has continued to lose market share - albeit modestly 
(see Table 1). As a result of the faster growth of her imports from the UK, the 
trade surplus has shrunk from $880 million in 1992 to $78 million in 1996; 
indeed, this year (1997) the trade balance will show a deficit if current trends 
continue. However, bilateral trade balances are of no great economic 
significance and little importance should be attached to them per se. Far more 
important is Brazil's loss of market share and this loss is likely to be accelerated 
in 1997 as figures for the first five months suggest a 10% drop in the value of 
Brazil's exports to the UK at a time when UK imports are growing rapidly. 
Turning now to the structure of bilateral trade, we find that Brazil's exports 
to the UK are relatively diversified with the top ten products accounting for 
some 55 per cent of the total. The structure of Brazil's exports to the UK, 
however, is quite different from the structure of Brazil's total exports, as Table 3 
makes clear. For example, the leading export (leaf tobacco and waste) represents 
some two per cent of total exports, but 11 per cent of exports to the UK; indeed, 
the top ten products to the UK account for less than 20 per cent of total Brazilian 
exports. 
The different structures in Table 3 capture the over-representation of primary 
and agroindustrial products in exports to the UK and under-representation of 
manufactured goods. This would not matter if the market opportunities for such 
War 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
products were favourable. However, the opposite is true: many of them are 
subject to the withdrawal of GSP status in the next few years; some (e.g. wood 
products; leaf tobacco; processed beef) are susceptible to campaigns in favour of 
reductions in consumption; while one (non-monetary gold) is highly cyclical and 
may be subject to re-export. Only one (piston engines, parts and components) is 
an important British import and in a listing of the 50 main UK imports with their 
leading suppliers Brazil appears just once (chemical wood pulp based on soda or 
sulphate).3 
Table 3. - The Structure of Brazil's Exports in 1996 (%) 
Leaf Tobacco and Waste 11.0 2.15 
Footwear, parts and components 7.7 3.46 
Gold, in intermediate form (non-monetary) 6.4 1.22 
Beef, processed 6.1 0.41 
Chemical wood pulp, soda or sulphate 5.6 2.0 
Piston engines, parts and components 5.5 2.15 
Plywood or laminated wood and similars 5.1 0.52 
Iron ore and concentrates 3.3 5.64 
Printing paper 2.2 0.66 
Carpentry assemblies for construction 2.2 0.26 
Other products 44.9 81.5 
Sources: SECEX (1997); Brazilian Embassy (1997). 
The Brazilian export structure to the UK is therefore a matter of some 
concern. Many of the leading products are vulnerable to a downward trend in 
consumption patterns; Brazil does not export to the UK many of the most 
important British imports; and the changes in the European GSP can be expected 
to have a negative effect on several exports. 
If Brazil's exports to other developed countries (other than the UK) had the 
same structure, it might be argued that little could be done to improve the 
situation in the short term. However, this is not the case. Exports to the USA 
(19.23% of the total) include many manufactured products (particularly auto 
parts). Brazil in 1996 also exported more within the EU to Holland (7.43%), 
3 This product, fifth in the list of Brazil's exports to the UK, is 31st in the list of UK total 
imports. See Brazilian Embassy (1997), p. 25. 
UK Total 
Germany (4.36%), Italy (3.21%) and Belgium/Luxembourg (3.0%) than to 
Britain (2.77%) and the structure in each case was quite different, although 
exports in all cases were dominated by primary and agroindustrial products. The 
most encouraging feature of Brazil's exports to the UK is the strong 
performance of piston engines, parts and components (see Table 3). Indeed, 
exports of auto parts are expected to grow with the decision by BMW to import 
engines for Rover assembly in the UK from Brazil. There has also been an 
aggressive and successful campaign to export poultry products in recent months. 
Overall, however, export performance is undynamic and likely to remain so in 
the short term; the measures needed to boost exports in the medium term are 
considered in the final section. 
British exports to Brazil are dominated by capital goods (see Table 4). 
Indeed, machinery and transport equipment account for nearly 50% of total 
exports. This helps to explain the rapid growth of UK exports to Brazil, since 
imports of capital goods have been particularly dynamic in recent years and 
Brazilian firms have been restructuring in order to be able to compete 
internationally. The second most important export product group is chemicals 
and related materials and these, together with machinery and transport 
equipment, account for nearly 75% of British exports to Brazil. 
Table 4. - UK Exports to Brazil in 1996: £mn and as a %age of total 
Beverages 42.4 5.0 
Minerals and Lubricants 15.3 1.8 
Chemicals and Related Materials 207.5 24.5 
Manufactured goods by material 58.8 6.9 
Machinery and Transport Equipment 410.8 48.5 
Miscellaneous Manufactured Articles 74.7 8.8 
Other Products 37.2 4.4 
Total 846.5 100 
Source: DTI (1997) 
When British exports to Brazil are examined using statistics on Brazil's 
imports from the UK (see SECEX, 1997), it is interesting to note that pistons for 
engines occupy the leading position; this means that there is a high level of intra-
industry trade in this sector, since it is also one of the main Brazilian exports to the 
UK (see Table 3). In the first five months of 1997, there was also spectacular 
growth in the export of transmitters, receivers and spare parts compared with the 
same period in the previous year (+502.69%). 
£mn % of Total 
British exports to Brazil are, in general, representative of the structure of 
total British exports. Furthermore, this structure has benefited from the 
restructuring of the Brazilian economy, which has given special importance to 
capital goods imports. It is premature to talk of a permanent gain in the British 
share of Brazilian imports, as Table 1 makes clear, but it is encouraging that 
Britain has at least kept its share of a fast-growing market as a result of the 
complementarity between Brazilian import requirements and British export 
capacity.4 It is the lack of complementarity that was one of the main reasons for 
the loss of market share before 1990. British exports may also benefit from a 
revision of the automobile regime if the WTO panel rules against Brazil's NTBs 
and high tariffs for automobile imports. 
There must be grave doubts, however, over the ability of the UK to sustain 
the high rate of growth of exports to Brazil achieved since 1992. The rapid 
growth of the Brazilian trade deficit since 1994 (estimated to have reached four 
per cent of GDP in the first half of 1997) has forced the authorities to adopt 
measures to restrict the growth of imports. These measures, including the ending 
of bank credit for imports in excess of $10,000, are bound to affect capital goods 
imports in general and British exports in particular. Britain is also vulnerable in 
some product groups to the trade preferences given to MERCOSUL partners. 
Although import growth may continue through 1998 (an election year in Brazil), 
the rate of growth is likely to be limited to no more than the rate of growth of 
exports in the medium term (see final section). Given the obstacles faced by 
Brazilian exporters on both the demand and supply side, British exporters will 
have to accept more modest rates of increase in the future. This still leaves 
plenty of opportunities to expand exports, but the 'golden age' of exporting to 
Brazil is almost certainly over. 
An Econometric Model of British and Brazilian Exports 
In order to understand the nature of British (Brazilian) underperformance in 
exports to Brazil (UK), an econometric model was constructed based on the 
standard gravity model of international trade.5 This model regresses bilateral 
exports on a series of independent variables, including population in foreign 
countries, GDP per head in foreign countries, and distance between the 
exporting country and its partners. In the case of the United Kingdom and 
Brazil, however, it was decided to incorporate four dummy variables: the first 
differentiates between partner countries that are islands and those that are not 
since island economies ceteris paribus have a greater propensity to import; the 
second differentiates between partner countries that are land-locked and those 
that are not; the third (unimportant for UK) differentiates between countries that 
share a common border with the exporting country and those that do not; the 
4 The British share rose from 1.96% in 1995 to 2.48% in 1996, but it is too early to say if 
this is a long-term change. 
51 am grateful to Hernan Vallejo for preparing the database and running the regressions 
on which this section is based. 
fourth differentiates between partner countries where English (Portuguese) is the 
first language and those where it is not, since it is widely assumed that British 
exporters prefer to sell in markets where English is widely used (this dummy is 
much less relevant for Brazil). 
The gravity model used in this analysis therefore takes the following form: 
EQUATION (1) 
In X j = cons tan t + fabi P O P . + p2 In G D P p c j + P3 In DIST + p4 In I S . D + 
P5 L . L . P . D + & C . B O R . D + fyC. L A N . D 
where 'In' stands for natural logarithms, 'X' for British (Brazilian) exports to 
country 'j ', TOP' for population in country 'j ', 'GDPpcj' for GDP per head in 
US dollars in country 'j ', 'DIST' for the distance between the UK (Brazil) and 
partner countries, TS.D' is the island dummy (1 for islands and 0 for other 
countries), 'L.L.P.D.' for Land-Locked Partner Country (1 if country has no sea 
coast and 0 elsewhere), 'C.BOR.D.' for Common Border Dummy (1 if domestic 
country has common border with partner country and 0 elsewhere) and 
'C.LAN.D.' is the common language dummy (1 for countries where English 
(Portuguese) is the first language and 0 elsewhere). The model was run for three 
separate years (1986, 1989 and 1992) and the results for the UK are given in 
Table 5. 
Table 5. - Results of Regressions for UK Exports: Dependent Variable is 
UK Bilateral Exports 
1986 0.643 1.116*** -5.586*** 141 0.84 101.82 
1989 0.539 1.110*** -6.061*** 131 0.86 106.47 
1992 0.703 0.935*** -8.069*** 90 0.92 132.79 
Note: *** Significant at 99%; ** significant at 95%; * significant at 90% level 
(a) Uses values of GDP pc at PPP US dollars as in the Penn World Tables 
The regression results are encouraging with high R2 and F statistics, 
indicating that much of the variation in the UK bilateral exports is explained by 
the independent variables. They show, for example, that the UK does export 
YEAR C.BOR.D C.LAN.D Constant No of R~ F 
observa-
tions 
YEAR inPOP InGDPpc InDlST ISJD L.L.PD 
1986 0.659*** 1.269*** -0.774*** -0.065* -0.461*** 
1989 0.697*** 1.319*** -0.813*** -0.003 -0.426** 
1992 0.711*** 1.453*** -0 719*** 0.129 -0.150 
more to English-speaking countries, ceteris paribus. Since the regressions are in 
logarithmic form, the coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities showing that 
a 10% increase in GDP per head in partner countries, for example, increases 
British exports by between 12.7% and 14.5%. Finally, the coefficients on 
population and distance are very significant, indicating that UK exports are 
higher to countries with larger populations and smaller to countries that are more 
distant. 
Equation (1) can be used to compare predicted UK exports with actual UK 
exports. In the case of Brazil, the data (see Table 6) confirm that British exports 
to Brazil in all three years are below the predicted level, implying 
underperformance by the UK. The degree of underperformance varies from 
20.6% in 1989 to 39.6% in 1992.6 
Table 6. - Actual and Predicted Values of UK Exports to Brazil ($mn) 
1986 432 554 -122 -22.0 
1989 555 699 -144 -20.6 
1992 481 796 -315 -39.6 
The results shown in Table 6 are of considerable interest, but they must be 
interpreted with caution. The version of the gravity model used in this paper is 
designed to reflect structural characteristics in bilateral trade relationships rather 
than policy changes. Thus, predicted British exports to Brazil in Equation (1) 
can only rise in the short term if GDP per head in current dollars increases (other 
independent variables - including population - are virtually unchanged over the 
short-term). The model cannot therefore take account of the surge in Brazilian 
imports as a result of the policy changes adopted after 1990. 
The results for Brazil are given in Table 7. They provide a similar picture to 
that given for the UK; the population and GDP per head of partner countries, 
together with distance to partner country, are highly significant explanatory 
variables, but the common language dummy is no longer of much importance 
(the number of trading partners where Portuguese is spoken is small). As with 
the UK, bilateral exports are sensitive to GDP per head in partner countries; a 
10% increase, for example, generates additional exports of approximately 15%. 
In Table 8 a comparison is made between actual and predicted exports from 
Brazil to the UK. They show that Brazil's exports have consistently 
underperformed with the degree of underperformance varying from 45.6% in 
6 The results for all countries (not shown here) are very revealing. They show that actual 
UK exports are below the predicted UK exports for all the main Latin American 
countries. 
Year Actual Predicted DiHt'mkY 'r DitTi'micc 
1989 to 69.6% in 1992. The latter figure should be interpreted with caution, 
however, as the predicted exports for that year were implausibly high. 
Table 7. Results of Regressions for Brazilan Exports: Dependent Variable 
is Brazil's Bilateral Exports 
1986 0.379 0.667 -6.982*** ! 130 0.79 65.84 
1989 0.799 0.807 -7.834*** 127 0.79 62.29 
1992 -0.140 -0.432 0.623 89 0.84 62.13 
Note: *** Significant at 99%; ** significant at 95%; * significant at 90% level 
(a) Uses values of GDP pc at PPP US dollars as in the Penn World Tables 
Table 8. - Actual and Predicted Values of Brazil s Exports To UK ($mn) 
1986 647 1,287 -640 -49.7 
1989 1,031 1,897 -866 -45.7 
1992 1,286 4,228 -2,942 -69.6 
The results of these econometric models demonstrate what has long been 
suspected: Britain and Brazil underperform in their exports to each other. The 
model, however, does not explain the underperformance in any causal sense. In 
the next two sections, I explore a number of hypotheses designed to explain why 
bilateral exports are so disappointing. 
British Underperformance 
The United Kingdom is a major international trader, with exports in 1995 of 
$239.4 billion and imports of $262.5 billion. Only the USA ($582.5 billion), 
Germany ($509.3 billion), Japan ($443 billion) and France ($286.7 billion) have 
higher exports. Britain is therefore the fifth most important trader in the world 
with 4.8% of world exports and 5.1% of world imports. 
The UK trades with all countries in the world and, ceteris paribus, we would 
expect its share of any given import market to be equal to its share of world 
Y ear Actual Predicted Difference % Difference 
YEAR CRORJ) C.LAN.D Constant No of R2 F 
observations 
1986 1.022*** 1.633*** -1.468*** 0.054 -0.388 
1989 0.949*** 1.537*** -1.191*** 0.273 -0.311 
1992 1U4*** 1.584*** -2.454*** 0.929*** -0.049 
YEAR InPOP InGDPpc'a) InDIST l$J> LJLP-D 
exports, i.e. 4.8% based on 1995 values. This is the starting point for an analysis 
of British exports to Brazil. 
As shown in Table 1, the British share of Brazil's imports is approximately 
2% as against the 'expected' share of 5% and an official target of 4%.7 The gap 
between expected and actual performance is therefore some 60%.8 This 
underperformance can be attributed to various factors and in this section I 
explore several hypotheses in an effort to identify the reasons for the shortfall.9 
Hypothesis 1. British underperformance in Brazil is due to 
overperformance in other markets. 
It is a matter of simple arithmetic that overperformance by British exports in 
certain markets must lead to underperformance elsewhere. In the case of the UK, 
exports to the rest of the European Union (EU) are particularly important and 
represent (in 1995) nearly 55% of the total;10 the UK has 7.3% of total EU 
(excluding the UK) imports - far above the 'expected' share of 4.8%. When the 
UK share of world trade is calculated to exclude the EU, the ratio falls to 3.4% 
and the gap (see fn. 8) to some 40%. Thus, overperformance in exports to the 
EU explains one-third of the underperformance in the Brazilian market.11 
Hypothesis 2. British underperformance is due to Brazil's overdependence 
on other markets. 
Like the UK, Brazil is a member of a regional integration scheme and has forged 
close trading links with its partners in MERCOSUL (Argentina, Paraguay and 
Uruguay). Its three partners' share of world exports is 0.5%, but their share of 
Brazil's imports (1995 figures) is 13.7%. Thus, Brazil is 'overdependent' on its 
MERCOSUL partners and must necessarily have a lower dependence on imports 
from other sources, including the UK. 
When Brazil's trade figures are adjusted for the difference between expected 
and actual MERCOSUL imports, the British share increases (1995 figures) to 
2.3%, i.e. the gap falls to some 50%. Thus, Brazil's MERCOSUL links explain a 
further 10% of the difference between actual and expected British performance. 
7 As part of the Link into Latin America campaign, launched in January 1995, the British 
government has set itself the target of doubling its share of the Latin American market. 
8 Call the expected share S(e) and the actual share S(a); then the gap is defined as {[S(e) -
S(a)]/S(e)} x 100. 
9 There are other hypotheses that could have been explored with more time; examples are 
(i) UK exports underperform because of overperformance of investment; (ii) UK exports 
underperform because of overperformance of services. 
10 It might be expected that the UK overperforms in the US market. This in fact is not 
true, as the UK accounts for only 3.6% of US imports (1995 figures). 
11 Note that, with this approach, the UK would be 'overperforming' if it succeeded in 
meeting the official target of 4% of the Brazilian import market. 
Hypothesis 3. The UK is not exporting the products that Brazil wants to 
import. 
If the growth of Brazil's imports takes place in products or product groups that are 
not exported by the UK, then it is difficult - not to say impossible - for the UK to 
achieve its expected share. In order to test this hypothesis, I have calculated the 
growth of Brazil's imports from 1990 to 1995 in 14 product groups (see Table 9) 
and ranked them in terms of their growth rates. I then ranked the same products in 
terms of the structure of British exports at the mid-point in the cycle (1993). A 
comparison of the two rankings gives a Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient of 
0.178. 
The maximum value for Spearman is unity, so that the actual correlation is 
quite low. For example, the most important British export (chemicals) is only 
seventh in the ranking of Brazil's import growth rates (see Table 9), while the 
fastest growing product group (automotive products) is sixth in the British export 
list. However, the calculation of the Spearman Coefficient is sensitive to the choice 
of product groups, base and terminal year and it is doubtful if the structure of UK 
exports explains underperformance to any significant degree. On the contrary, as 
we saw previously, there does seem to be a fair degree of complementarity at 
present between Brazil's need for capital goods and UK export capacity. 
Table 9. - Brazil's Import Growth and UK Export Structure 
Agricultural products 175 5 14 
Fuels 2 13 10 
Chemicals 140 7 1 
Textiles/Clothing 479 2 8 
Iron and Steel 47 12 11 
Other semi-manufactures 165 6 12 
Mining products (exc. fuels) 76 11 13 
Power-generating machines -7 14 4 
Other non-elec. machinery 96 9 3 
Office and telecom equip. 243 3 5 
Electrical machinery 127 8 7 
Automotive products 1,397 1 6 
Other transport equipment 82 10 9 
Miscellaneous 190 4 2 
J 
Sources: WTO (1996); DTI (1997). 
Brazil {%) J Brazil Rank UK Rank 
The rates of growth of Brazil's imports in Table 9 take no account of the 
initial level of imports. It is therefore of interest to compare the structure of 
Brazil's imports with the structure of British exports and this reveals some major 
differences. For example, food, drink and tobacco products (1992/3 figures) 
accounted for nearly 8% of British exports and only 1.3% of total Brazilian 
imports; on the other hand, mineral products (including oil) represented 23.3% 
of Brazilian total imports, but only 2.5% of British exports. However, the 
structure is similar for many capital goods and it is difficult to argue that the 
structure of Brazilian imports works against the growth of British exports. 
Hypothesis 4. The UK underperforms by comparison with its main EU 
partners. 
This is a particularly interesting hypothesis and one that often arises in 
discussions of British trade performance with Latin America. Strictly speaking, 
it is not a hypothesis at all and it does not 'explain' British underperformance in 
any sense; yet it is important to know if the UK is failing to match the export 
effort of its partners in Brazil. 
In Table 10 I have listed the exports to Brazil (1995 figures) of those EU 
countries whose exports exceed or come close to those for the UK. As a 
proportion of total exports, the Italian performance is by far the best (1.2%) and 
the British the worst (0.4%), although the French performance (0.5%) is not 
dissimilar to the British. When expressed as a share of Brazil's imports, 
Germany (9.48%) moves into first place with Spain (1.6%) last. 
These trade shares in themselves are not very helpful, as they take no 
account of relative weights. Table 10 therefore gives shares of world imports for 
each country and the gap between actual and expected performance is then 
calculated using the same methodology as before (see footnote 8). It now 
appears that all countries except Italy underperform in their exports to Brazil, 
although the degree of underperformance is greatest for the UK. 
Hypothesis 1 explained part of British underperformance in terms of 
overperformance in exports to the EU. We can do the same for the UK's EU 
partners and this is done in Table 10. Because of their heavy reliance on the EU 
market, Spain and Germany now join Italy as overperformers in the Brazilian 
market, i.e. their exports to Brazil are greater than what one would expect in 
view of the dependence on the EU market. This leaves France and Britain as the 
underperformers, with British underperformance significantly greater than 
French. 
Hypothesis 2 explained part of British underperformance in terms of Brazil's 
dependence on MERCOSUL. We can do the same for the other EU countries 
and this is also shown in Table 10. The French underperformance now virtually 
disappears, leaving the UK as the only EU country in this group with a 
significant underperformance in its exports to Brazil. 
The evidence of Table 10 points strongly to British underperformance in the 
Brazilian market by comparison with other EU countries. Spain, for example, 
with only $26 billion of non-EU exports compared with $113 billion for the UK, 
exported almost as much to Brazil in 1995 as the UK. The Italian performance is 
also very impressive with Italy enjoying 5.7% of the Brazilian market against 
(an unadjusted) share of world exports of 4.7%, i.e. a similar share of world 
exports to the UK and a share of Brazilian imports that is three times larger. 
Table 10. European Union Export Performance to Brazil: 1995. 
Total exports ($bn) 239 232 287 509 92 
- to Brazil ($mn) 975 2,859 1,382 4,720 814 
- %age to Brazil 0.4 1.2 0.5 0.9 0.9 
%age of Brazilian imports 1.96 5.74 2.78 9.48 1.6 
%age world exports 4.8 4.7 5.8 10.3 1.8 
Gap (%) - see fn.8 -59 +22 -52 -8 j - 1 1 j 
Non-EU exports $bn 113 100 107 219 i 26 i 
% non-EU world imp 3.5 3.1 3.3 6.8 0.8 
Adjusted gap (%)12 -44 +85 -16 +39 +100 
Gap adjusted for MERCOSUL 
(%) 
-35 +113 -3 +60 +135 
1 
Source: derived from IMF (1996). 
It is not possible to explain in this paper the underperformance of the UK in 
relation to its EU partners, but this is a subject worthy of closer study. Part of the 
explanation could be the structure of these countries' exports, but part is almost 
certainly due to different marketing strategies and the pattern of direct foreign 
investment. In any case, the evidence of Table 10 indicates unambiguously that 
the UK - notwithstanding the recent growth - is lagging behind in exports to 
Brazil. 
Brazil's Underperformance in Exports to UK 
Although Brazil is the tenth largest economy in the world, as measured by GDP in 
dollar terms, it is only 23rd in importance in the list of exporters (1995 data). As a 
result, Brazil has less than one per cent of world trade (0.9% of world exports) and, 
12 The adjusted gap compares actual share of Brazil's imports with expected share based 
on proportion of non-EU world exports. 
UK Italy France Germany Spain 
ceteris paribus, this is its expected share of the British import market. Brazil's 
actual share of the market in 1995 was 0.58%, implying an unadjusted gap of 36%. 
This is much smaller than the unadjusted UK gap (60%), but is still significant. As 
before, therefore, I will apply a number of hypotheses to see if the gap can be 
explained. 
Hypothesis 1. Brazil underperforms in the UK market because it 
overperforms in exports to MERCOSUL. 
Brazil's exports to its MERCOSUL partners have grown rapidly in recent years. 
In 1995 exports to partners reached $6.15 billion and this represented 22.9% of 
all partner imports. Thus, Brazil has a bigger share of the neighbouring market 
than is 'expected' from a simple analysis of Brazil's share of world exports, and 
this means that Brazil's trade performance with the UK needs to be adjusted to 
take into account the over-reliance on MERCOSUL. 
Brazil's non-MERCOSUL exports (in 1995) were $40.35 billion, i.e. 0.79% 
of non-MERCOSUL world imports. If we now compare the actual performance 
in the British market with the new 'expected' share, the (adjusted) gap falls to 
27%. Thus, dependence on MERCOSUL explains about 10% of the unadjusted 
gap in Brazilian performance in the UK market, but it does not eliminate it. 
Hypothesis 2. Brazilian underperformance is due to the UK's 
overdependence on other markets. 
Britain's trade dependence on the European Union reduces the scope for Brazil 
to export to the UK. Although the share of British imports coming from the EU 
market is not as high as for many EU members, it is still in excess of 50%. Thus, 
we need to adjust the trade figures to take this dependence into account. 
The UK had total imports in 1995 of $263.8 billion. Of these, 51% came 
from EU partners. Total EU exports represent 37.4% of world imports; thus, the 
rest of the EU could 'expect' to have this share of British imports. When British 
imports from the EU are adjusted (downwards) for the 'excess' imports from the 
EU, the Brazilian share rises from 0.58% to 0.67% and the gap falls again to 
26%. 
It therefore appears that about one-third of the unadjusted gap of 36% is 
explained by Brazilian overdependence on MERCOSUL and about one-third by 
UK overdependence on the European Union, leaving a relatively small gap -
about 15% - that is unexplained. This unexplained part of the gap is almost 
certainly due to the lack of complementarity between the Brazilian export 
structure and the UK import pattern. This hypothesis is not tested formally here, 
since it was discussed at some length in the second section of the paper. It is 
worth emphasising, however, that Brazil's main exports to the UK (see Table 3) 
have almost no correlation with the structure of British imports as given in Table 
11 along with the main suppliers. 
Table 11. Top Ten British Imports and Main Suppliers 
1. Crude Oil Norway Algeria Saudi 
Arabia 
Kuwait Venezuela 
2. Motor Cars Germany France Japan Italy 
| Korea 
3. Aero Parts a a a a a 
4. Petroleum Norway Sweden Germany 
5. Lorries Germany Sweden Holland Belgium Spain 
6. Gear Boxes Japan Germany France Belgium | USA 
7. Cane Sugar Mauritius. Guyana Jamaica Swaziland Trinidad 
8. Cathodes Canada Poland Chile Peru Russia 
9. Polyethylene Holland France Germany Sweden 
10. Tractors Germany France USA Holland Japan 
(a) Figures split between EU countries (34%) and others (66%) 
Source: Brazilian Embassy (1997). 
Brazil's name does not appear in Table 11 and this in itself is a matter of 
some concern. However, more worrying is the vulnerability of Brazil's exports 
to changes in EU trade policies and British consumption patterns. These matters 
will be addressed in the next section. 
Prospects 
The prospects for Brazil's exports to the UK and British exports to Brazil are 
determined by : 
a) Macroeconomic performance - the growth rate of real GDP is a first 
proxy for the evolution of a country's imports and, by implication, its partners' 
exports. 
b) The ratio of imports to GDP - if the ratio of imports to GDP is rising 
(falling), this will have a positive (negative) effect, ceteris paribus, on the 
imports from partner countries over and above the real GDP effect. 
c) The import share - the British (Brazilian) share of Brazil's (UK's) imports 
can alter as a result of changes in relative prices, a shift in consumption patterns 
or export promotion strategies. 
In what follows, I shall explore each of these three determinants for Brazil 
and the UK in order to assess the prospects for British and Brazilian exports 
Suppliers 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 
respectively. 
(A) Brazil (i.e. Prospects for UK Exports) 
The Piano Real, launched in July 1994, has brought annual inflation in Brazil 
down to single figures, but the reform process is still far from complete and the 
real exchange rate has appreciated. As a result, nominal and real interest rates 
have remained high both to attract the capital flows needed to finance the current 
account deficit and as a consequence of the budget deficit. The tight monetary 
policy, coupled with import restrictions (see below), has led to a reduction in the 
consensus forecasts for real GDP growth. These now average 3.5% for 1997 and 
4.3% for 1998.13 However, gross fixed capital formation - relevant for British 
exports of capital goods - is expected to rise by almost double these rates (7.8% 
in 1997 and 8.7% in 1998). No reliable estimates of GDP growth for 1999 and 
2000 are available, but a realistic figure is five per cent (see Table 12). 
Brazil's ratio of imports to GDP has been increasing rapidly since 1993, 
although it is still low by comparison with other countries at similar stages of 
development. In 1996 the ratio reached 6.8% and is expected to reach 7.6% in 
1997 (assuming imports of $61.5 billion and GDP in dollar terms of $809 
billion). Exports, however, remained at 6.1% of GDP in 1996 and are estimated 
at 6.3% in 1997 (assuming their value reaches $50.4 billion). The trade deficit is 
still modest, but Brazil also has a large deficit in services (mainly interest 
payments) so that the current account deficit is estimated to exceed 4% of GDP 
in 1997 compared with almost zero in 1994. 
This rate of increase in the current account deficit (and its ratio to GDP) 
cannot be expected to continue, since financial markets would react negatively if 
the ratio were to exceed 5%. With privatisation proceeds of nearly $70 billion 
(including the Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD)) expected in the next few 
years, there is not likely to be any shortage of foreign finance for a deficit in the 
4 to 5% range. However, keeping the deficit in this range has major implications 
for the growth of imports. 
Much will depend on the growth of Brazil's exports. If Brazil's exports were 
to grow rapidly, its imports could also expand rapidly without a major 
deterioration in the current account deficit. Export promotion policies have 
begun and the export sector is benefiting from the process of restructuring 
associated with the reduction in the so-called Brazil cost (e.g. the states' Imposto 
sobre Circula^ao de Mercadorias e Servigos (ICMS)), mergers and acquisitions 
and the rise in labour productivity. However, exports are still hampered by an 
uncompetitive exchange rate, a narrow enterprise base (some 500 firms out of 3 
million are responsible for around 75% of Brazil's exports) and a lack of 
detailed knowledge about foreign markets. The consensus forecast for exports in 
1997 is $50.4 billion and in 1998 $53.8 billion. These may be unduly 
pessimistic, but they do allow for import growth at 10% before the current 
13 See Latin American Consensus Forecasts (1997), p.8. 
account deficit exceeds 5% of GDP. This rate of growth of imports is faster than 
GDP so that the ratio of imports to GDP should be approximately 9% by 2000 -
still low by international standards (see Table 12). 
The UK share of imports remained stable at approximately 2% between 1990 
and 1995 - rising to 2.5% in 1996 (based on preliminary figures). With an 
unchanged share (i.e. 2%), UK imports can be expected to reach $1,634 million 
in 2000. However, Britain hopes to increase the share to 4% which - if achieved 
- means that British exports would reach $3,268 million by the start of the new 
millennium. 
Many factors will impinge on the UK share of Brazil's imports - not only 
British export promotion policies. In Britain's favour is the rapid growth in 
capital goods imports, which is expected to continue as a result of the high levels 
of direct foreign investment, the privatisation process and the restructuring of the 
Brazilian productive sectors in the face of growing international competition. 
However, the strength of the pound sterling puts British exports at a 
disadvantage compared with other industrial countries, e.g. France, Germany 
and Italy. In addition, Brazil's MERCOSUL commitments mean that relative 
prices will shift in favour of imports from partner countries as the remaining 
barriers to intra-regional trade are removed and the CET is extended to all 
products. 
Table 12. Simulations For Brazil 
GDP ($ billion) 782 809 844 866 931 
Growth p.a. (%) 2.9 35 4.3 5.0 5.0 
Exports ($bn) 47.7 50.4 53.8 59 2 65.1 
Imports ($bn) 53.3 61.5 67.5 74.3 81.7 
Imports/GDP (%) 6.8 7.6 8.0 8.6 8.8 
UK import ($mn) 1,323 
- 2% share 1,634 5.4 
- 2.5% share 2,043 11.5 
- 3.0% share 2,451 16.7 
The most plausible scenario is therefore a British share of Brazil's imports 
between 2 and 3% (see Table 12). This gives a lower bound estimate for the 
growth of British exports to Brazil of 5.4% and a higher bound of 16.7%. This 
is, in fact, a satisfactory outcome for Britain and reflects the huge effort put into 
export promotion in Brazil by the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) and the Link into Latin America 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Annual 
Growth (%) 
(LILA) campaign. However, it does mean that Brazil will no longer be the 
fastest growing market for British exports. 
The wild card in this scenario is the possibility of a Free Trade Agreement 
between MERCOSUL and the EU. Such an agreement would push relative 
prices in favour of all EU exporters at the expense of imports from other sources 
(particularly the USA). It is not, however, a short-term prospect and in this 
author's view is not even a medium-term possibility. I have therefore not 
included it in my simulations of British exports to Brazil. 
(B) United Kingdom (i.e. Prospects for Brazil's Exports) 
The UK economy has been recovering strongly since the deep recession at the 
beginning of the 1990s and the new Labour government has inherited a 
relatively healthy situation. In his first budget on 2 July 1997, the Labour 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gordon Brown, outlined the medium-term growth 
prospects for the British economy. These assume real GDP growth above trend 
in 1997 before falling back to the long-term sustainable rate of growth of 2.25% 
in 1998 and thereafter (see Table 13). 
The Chancellor emphasised the need for fiscal tightening and this was 
applied mainly to the corporate sector. The post-budget consensus was that he 
had not done enough to rein in consumer demand, making further increases in 
interest rates inevitable. The interest rate differential between the UK and its EU 
partners and the difficulties faced by Britain's European partners in their efforts 
to meet the Maastricht criteria for a single currency have made sterling a one-
way bet for the time being; as a result, the pound has strengthened dramatically 
in the last 12 months and import growth (in terms of volume) has accelerated; 
the rate of growth of imports is expected to continue to outpace the rate of 
growth of GDP (both measured at constant prices) leading to a rise in the ratio 
of imports to GDP (see Table 13). 
Table 13. Simulations for UK 
GDP Growth (%) 
j 
2.5 j 3.25 2.25 2.25 2.25 
Export Growth -% 7.0 | 6.25 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Import Growth -% 8.5 7.25 7.75 5.0 5.0 
Import/GDP (%) 35.2 36.6 38.4 39.0 40.0 
Imports ($bn) 282 302 325 342 359 
- Brazil ($mn) 1,573 
- Share (0.6%) 2,153 8.2% 
- Share (0.5%) 1,794 3.3% 
1996 1997 1998 1999 20M Annual 
Growth i Cf i 
The UK is a very open economy and British imports of goods and services 
represented in 1996 35.2% of GDP at factor cost (1990 prices). British imports 
in 1996 are estimated at $282 billion and they are expected to continue to grow 
in excess of GDP. The rate of growth in dollar terms is hard to calculate in view 
of changes in the dollar-sterling exchange rate and movements in international 
commodity prices. I have therefore assumed growth of imports in current dollars 
at the same rate as the forecast rate of growth of the volume of imports, 
increasing the import share to 40% by 2000. 
The Brazilian share of imports was approximately 0.6% in the first half of 
the 1990s (see Table 1), i.e. six-tenths of one per cent. However, Brazil would 
be doing extremely well if it held on to this share for the following reasons: 
a) There was no increase in the dollar value of Brazil's exports to the UK in 
1996. 
b) There was a 10% fall in the dollar value of Brazil's exports to the UK in 
the first five months of 1997. 
c) Brazil will lose most of its remaining Generalised System of Preferences 
(GSP) privileges in the UK (and EU) market by 2000. 
d) The expected entry of Cyprus, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, 
Estonia and Slovenia to the EU after 2002 will give these countries (whose 
combined exports to the UK exceed Brazil's by a substantial margin) a price 
advantage in many products (e.g. shoes). 
There are some offsetting factors: reform of the Common Agricultural Policy 
may increase opportunities for Brazil's farm exports; investment in Brazil by 
UK companies (and in the UK by Brazilian firms) will create opportunities for 
intra-firm trade (e.g. Rover engines); the strength of sterling against the dollar 
(and by implication the real) is of some assistance to Brazil. However, it is very 
unlikely that these factors in themselves are sufficient to reverse an expected 
decline in Brazil's share of UK imports. The optimistic scenario, therefore, is 
that Brazil retains a share of 0.6% and the pessimistic one is that it falls to 0.5%; 
this gives rise to annual export growth between 1996 and 2000 in the range 
3.3% to 8.2% (see Table 13). 
Brazil does not devote the same attention to the British market as the UK 
devotes to the Brazilian market. Trade missions are almost unknown, although 
one came in 1997 from Sao Paulo, and within Europe Brazil exports more to 
Belgium, France, Germany and Italy than to Britain. This lack of attention is a 
major reason for the poor performance of Brazil in the UK. The British 
economy is one of the most open in the world, but the structure of Brazil's 
exports works against their expansion. Brazil needs to shift its exports to Britain 
towards manufactured goods and develop greater knowledge of the market 
through research, joint ventures and trade missions. 
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